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Attorney Compensation in Bankruptcy: 
THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("the 
Code") have few advocates among cred-
itors of individuals and businesses elect-
ing to declare bankruptcy. Much criticism 
is focused upon the payments of legal 
fees out of the estate to the debtor's at-
torney immediately prior to the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition. Were these pay-
ments made to another creditor, they might 
receive greater scrutiny. 
Unlike post-petition legal fees, pre-
petition fees are not subject to avoidance 
by the trustee in bankruptcy or by the 
court; therefore, it is customary for bank-
ruptcy attorneys to require that their fees 
be paid prior to the filing of the petition. 
To recover any outstanding balance re-
maining at the time of filing, the attorney 
must petition the court for payment by the 
trustee out of the debtor's estate. Pur-
suant to Bankruptcy Rule 219, the debt-
or's petition must contain separate dis-
closure statements for all attorneys' fees 
paid within a year of filing and for the 
bankruptcy work itself. The court may ex-
amine these disclosure statements and 
may deny the payment request or order 
the attorney to reimburse the estate. In 
either case, the court considers the rea-
sonableness of the fees. 
This article outlines the basic proce-
dure used by the bankruptcy and appel-
late courts to determine reasonable pre-
petition attorneys' fees and analyzes the 
topic under the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. 
Attorneys' Fees in General 
Attorneys are prohibited from charging 
or collecting "clearly excessive fee[s]."1 
The Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility DR 2-1 06(A) states that "[a] 
lawyer shall not enter into an agreement 
for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly 
excessive fee." The American Bar As-
sociation has interpreted this Disciplinary 
Rule in only a few opinions, and in no 
case has it interpreted this Rule in the 
bankruptcy context.2 Furthermore, the 
ABA, the Maryland State Bar Association, 
and the local bar associations have pub-
lished no guidelines for attorneys con-
cerning reasonableness of fees in any sit-
uation. In fact, the ABA recommended in 
1973 that all state and local bar associ-
ations remove "minimum" or "sug-
gested" fee schedules.3 
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In order to limit excessive legal fees, 
the ABA has recommended that attor-
neys consider several factors when set-
ting fees.4 In their review of fee requests, 
the courts have established additional 
factors. Basically, two methods are uti-
lized. In Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. 
American Radiator and Sanitary Corp.,s 
the Third Circuit attempted to establish 
the first set of guidelines for determining 
the reasonableness of fees. The court used 
a method commonly known as the "lode-
star" method. Reasonableness of the fee 
petition is determined by ascertaining the 
attorney's normal billing rate and calcu-
lating the amount that would be charged 
if the rate were multiplied by the number 
of the attorney's billed hours. The court 
stated that this calculation is "the only 
reasonably objective basis for valuing an 
attorney's services."6 The figure or lode-
star obtained may then be increased or 
decreased according to the judge's de-
termination of two subsequent factors: 
the probability of success and the quality 
of the attorney's work. The judge must 
consider the risk of failure inherent in the 
case, weighing such considerations as the 
outcome of criminal actions against the 
same defendants and the novelty of the 
issue. The quality of the attorney's work 
is determined by the difficulty or com-
plexity of the issues presented, the at-
torney's ability demonstrated in the court-
room and the recovery obtained.? A 
minority of circuits have utilized this 
method.8 
A second method has gained more 
widespread acceptance. In the seminal 
case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Ex-
press, Inc., the Fifth Circuit listed twelve 
factors to be considered in determining 
fees. They are: 
(1) the time and labor required; 
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions; 
(3) the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly; 
(4) the preclusion of other employ-
ment due to acceptance of the 
case; 
(5) the customary fee; 
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contin-
gent; 
(7) time limits imposed by client or 
circumstances; 
(8) the amount involved and results 
obtained; 
(9) the experience, reputation and 
ability of the attorneys; 
(10) the "undesirability" of the case; 
(11) the nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the 
client; and 
(12) awards in similar cases.lO 
After weighing the twelve factors, the 
court will make an award and should ex-
plicitly state its reasons for the amount 
so awarded,11 so that appellate courts can 
determine if the trial judge has abused 
his discretinnY 
Attorneys' Fees in 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy is possibly the only context 
in which the court is mandated to protect 
the client from the attorney. Until the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was en-
acted in 1979, bankruptcy cases were 
governed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.13 
Under the 1898 Act, compensation of at-
torneys was subject to court review under 
§ 60(d) and Rule 220. 14 The Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals utilized that power by 
extending the Johnson analysis to bank-
ruptcy proceedings in In Re First Colonial 
Corp.1S The inherent sensitivity of bank-
ruptcy proceedings, however, required 
further economy in awarding attorneys' 
fees. 16 Thus two variations of the John-
son analysis evolved. First, the judge 
should keep in mind the overriding policy 
of efficient administration of bankruptcy 
estates. Since the debtor's attorney does 
not act in a private capacity but rather as 
an officer of the court, he should not ex-
pect to receive as large a fee as he might 
in a non-bankruptcy proceeding.1? The 
second variation from Johnson stems from 
the court's refusal to award "double com-
pensation"-awarding fees to attorneys 
who serve the estate in more than one 
capacity-which was also prohibited by 
the 1898 Act. The court should determine 
whether the attorney's application for 
compensation contains documentation of 
duplicated efforts in the different capac-
ities.18 With these policy considerations 
in mind, the court should then determine 
the value of the attorney's services in terms 
of the Johnson factors discussed above.19 
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 
1978 (the Code), the emphasis has shifted 
from giving the judge total discretion to 
determine reasonable fees to attempting 
to set a standard that the judge may fol-
low. Under § 330 of the Code, 20 the court 
must provide notice and hearing and may 
then award "reasonable compensation for 
actual, necessary services rendered ... 
based on the time, the nature, the extent, 
and the value of such services, and the 
cost of comparable services other than in 
a case under this title."21 Thus under the 
Code, an attorney need not expect to re-
ceive less in a bankruptcy case than in 
another case. The customary fees in non-
bankruptcy cases become an indicator of 
reasonable fees in bankruptcy cases. The 
spirit of economy employed under the 1898 
Act is no longer a requirement under the 
Code. 22 
On August 1 , 1983 the New Bankruptcy 
Rules and Official Forms went into effect. 
Rule 2016 replaced Rule 219 which gov-
erned compensation for services ren-
dered. The new rule is identical to Rule 
219, except that the subsection concern-
ing the bases for allowance of compen-
sation has been incorporated into § 330, 
and the prohibition against sharing com-
pensation has been included in § 504.23 
The substance of the rule, however, has 
not been altered. 
Please! Please! 
Payments to the Debtor's 
Attorney 
The Code provides in § 547 that a 
transfer of property of the debtor for an 
antecedent debt within ninety days of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition is a pref-
erential transfer. As such, it is avoidable 
by the trustee because a debtor is pre-
sumed to be insolvent within the ninety-
day period and (unless proven otherwise) 
any transfer of property during that time 
is presumed to work to the benefit of one 
creditor and to the detriment of the others. 
The trustee is therefore given the power 
to demand return of the property. 
The debtor's attorney enjoys a partic-
ular confidentiality with the client which 
may become a breeding ground for mis-
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conduct in pre-petition transactions. Con-
gress recognized this problem in Senate 
Report No. 95-989 when it stated: 
Payments to a debtor's attorney pro-
vide serious potential for evasion of 
creditor protection provisions of the 
bankruptcy laws, and serious poten-
tial for overreaching by the debtor's 
attorney, and should be subject to 
careful scrutiny.24 
Because of their relationship with the client, 
some attorneys have attempted to cir-
cumvent the preference provisions of the 
Code by obtaining an attorney's lien upon 
certain assets of the debtor, such as his 
accounts receivable. As secured credi-
tors, their claim has priority over unse-
cured creditors. Many courts, however, 
have avoided these liens a:s preferential 
transfers when there is no evidence pre-
sented of perfection of the security inter-
est,25 when the payments are made from 
funds obtained through litigation per-
formed by the attorney,26 or when the at-
torney has knowledge of the impending 
bankruptcy.27 
The trustee may not avoid the payment 
of a debt which is not antecedent, or one 
which is made during the ninety-day pe-
riod, if it is made in the ordinary course 
of business and paid within 45 days of 
the incurrence of the debt,28 Thus, pay-
ment to the debtor's attorney for bank-
ruptcy-related work is not a preferential 
transfer and is not avoidable by the trustee. 
Because of the threat of overreaching as 
discussed in the Senate Report,29 Bank-
ruptcy Courts must be careful to protect 
the assets of the estate from depletion. It 
may be difficult to detect preferential pay-
ments to the attorney since the attorney 
prepares the petition for the debtor and 
since the attorney may disguise the pay-
ments for non-bankruptcy work as part of 
the payment for bankruptcy-related mat-
ters. The court and the trustee examine 
payments made during the preferential 
period to another creditor with greater 
scrutiny to determine if a fraudulent trans-
fer has occurred. A lighter scrutiny is ap-
plied when examining payments to attor-
neys. Attorneys must affix to the debtor's 
petition a statement of their fees and any 
unpaid balance due from the debtor's es-
tate. Under § 329, the court may cancel 
any agreement for compensation or order 
the return of any excess payment if such 
payments are deemed to exceed the rea-
sonable value of such services. 
Practical Application of Fee 
Examinations 
The standard for reasonableness, al-
though subject to the Johnson or lodestar 
analysis. and § 330, is nevertheless within 
the judge's sound discretion. In the United 
18 
States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Maryland, Baltimore Division, the judge 
sets an ideal fee for particular types of 
bankruptcy, and issues a Show Cause 
order as to why the fee should not be 
diminished if the amount listed in the pe-
tition exceeds the limit the judge has set. 
The court does not disclose the actual 
amount of the maximum fees allowable. 
While this non-disclosure protects some 
bankruptcy estates from overreaching by 
the debtor's attorney, it also deprives at-
torneys of guidelines to determine fair and 
equitable fees. In fact, this practice pro-
motes litigation by failing to provide scru-
pulous attorneys with assistance in set-
ting fees and by chastizing them after the 
fees are set. With the immense number 
of bankruptcy cases filed each year, there 
is little chance that each case will be ex-
amined to determine if the fees charged 
are reasonable. If there is no objection to 
the amount, the court allows the com-
pensation if it does not exceed its limit. 
While attorneys have the ethical obli-
gation to charge a reasonable fee,3o with-
out standards to guide them the task is 
difficult. There appear to be three stand-
ards applied when dealing with attorneys' 
fees in bankruptcy: the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, the Bankruptcy 
Code, and case law (such as First Colo-
nial). While these standards appear to 
overlap, it is unclear how they are in-
tended to interact, when they are in-
tended to apply, and which takes prec-
edence. If the court determines that a fee 
is excessive, should a complaint be filed 
with the Ethics Committee? If a fee is 
found to be excessive, is it per se uneth-
ical? These questions and more need to 
be answered. 
Conclusion 
In order to protect unwary clients and 
to prevent subsequent litigation, the local 
bar associations should examine attor-
neys' fees and develop recommenda-
tions as to what fees are reasonable. The 
present standards in DR 2-106 are 
ambiguous: "[a] fee is clearly excessive 
when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer 
of ordinary prudence would be left with a 
definite and firm conviction that the fee is 
in excess of a reasonable fee."31 (em-
phasis added.) Without guidelines, the at-
torney may, even without so intending, 
charge a fee that is later considered to 
be excessive. The reluctance on the part 
of the bar associations to establish guide-
lines is an overreaction to the prohibition 
against fixing clearly improper minimum 
fees.32 
In the absence of sufficient guidelines, 
however, attorneys should take it upon 
themselves to ascertain reasonable rates 
in the community and attempt to keep 
them to a minimum. Although the Code 
no longer requires economy in fees, the 
bankruptcy bar should consider it their 
ethical obligation under DR 2-106 to 
charge lower-than-normal fees to clients 
who contract for their services because 
of financial problems. Rather than re-
maining silent, creditors should also be-
come more involved by objecting to fees 
which appear excessive. In many liqui-
dation cases, the amount received by the 
debtor's attorney for bankruptcy matters 
may equal half of the amount owed to 
creditors. These fees, however, do not 
trigger the court's alarm by exceeding the 
amount set for liquidation cases. Height-
ened awareness of the ethical obligation 
should benefit both the petitioner and the 
creditor in many bankruptcy cases. 
* Kimberly Armstrong is a third-year law stu-
dent at the University of Baltimore School of 
Law who has been working in the area of 
bankruptcy. 
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Recent Developments 
(continued from page 4) 
available in divorce and criminal courts: 
"The criminal law may vindicate society's 
interest in punishing a wrongdoer but it 
cannot compensate an injured spouse for 
her or his suffering and damages. Divorce 
or separation provide escape from tor-
tious abuse but can hardly be equated 
with a civil right to redress and compen-
sation for personal injuries." Merenoff V. 
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951,962 
(1978). 
Justice Couch, joined by Justice Ro-
dowsky, dissented in Boblitz, based on 
his belief that such a change would be 
best made by the legislature. The majority 
held that in the present case there existed 
no legislative barrier to the abrogation of 
the doctrine, since it was a common law 
rule brought about by judicial decisions. 
The court further stated that the doctrine 
of stare decisis should not be construed 
as a prohibition against changing a rule 
of law that has become unsound in the 
circumstances of modern life. 
While the decision in Boblitz may be 
viewed as a giant step forward in Mary-
land tort law, there are circumstances in 
which the interspousal immunity rule may 
still apply. The court stated that certain 
conduct that would be tortious between 
strangers would not be tortious between 
spouses due to the mutual concessions 
implied in the marital relationship. The 
doctrine of intra-family tort immunity was 
untouched by the Boblitz decision. The 
court also limited its holding to cases 
sounding in negligence and did not ad-
dress cases which involved intentional 
torts. 
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